I've had great experiences with Zagg through all my smartphones. IPhone case withstood my full body weight forcing it to the ground, the HD Glass for S7 chipped the screen protector and started to crack after falling down mountain hike, while the screen itself was in perfect condition. I've twice had to use the replacement option, and have been pleased with it both times.This screen cover is better suited, I find, for tge S7 compared to the Glass S7 case, which made the pull down menu and back/tab buttons nearly inaccessible. When that happened, Zagg refunded my Glass purchase upon return, and u havr been happy with the HD screen protector ever since. Some complaints are about how it's not rntoreky flush against the curved edges of the phone, but I find with my Spigen case it's works well because then the screen isn't moving because of the case.Overall, very big fan of Zagg protectors.

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They have been able to withstand multiple full force falls, while the screen has been left intact each time. Designed for use with Samsung Galaxy S7 cell phones. To complement and protect your phone.; Military Grade components. Were originally designed to protect military helicopter blades now deliver unmatched protection for your devices.; Self-healing Nano-Memory Technology. Scientifically formulated with smart molecules that heal from scratches and dings over and over.; Ultimate HD clarity. Accentuates sharp images and vibrant colors. Defend against scratches with this InvisibleShield HD Screen Protector for Samsung Galaxy S7.

The HD clarity delivers enhanced visibility of apps, video and images, and the shock absorption layer keeps your screen safe from damage. Featuring self-healing Nano-memory technology, this InvisibleShield HD Screen Protector keeps your screen free from scratches and dings. I've had great experiences with Zagg through all my smartphones. IPhone case withstood my full body weight forcing it to the ground, the HD Glass for S7 chipped the screen protector and started to crack after falling down mountain hike, while the screen itself was in perfect condition. I've twice had to use the replacement option, and have been pleased with it both times.This screen cover is better suited, I find, for tge S7 compared to the Glass S7 case, which made the pull down menu and back/tab buttons nearly inaccessible. When that happened, Zagg refunded my Glass purchase upon return, and u havr been happy with the HD screen protector ever since. Some complaints are about how it's not rntoreky flush against the curved edges of the phone, but I find with my Spigen case it's works well because then the screen isn't moving because of the case.Overall, very big fan of Zagg protectors.

They have been able to withstand multiple full force falls, while the screen has been left intact each time. I've had great experiences with Zagg through all my smartphones. IPhone case withstood my full body weight forcing it to the ground, the HD Glass for S7 chipped the screen protector and started to crack after falling down mountain hike, while the screen itself was in perfect condition. I've twice had to use the replacement option, and have been pleased with it both times.This screen cover is better suited, I find, for tge S7 compared to the Glass S7 case, which made the pull down menu and back/tab buttons nearly inaccessible. When that happened, Zagg refunded my Glass purchase upon return, and u havr been happy with the HD screen protector ever since. Some complaints are about how it's not rntoreky flush against the curved edges of the phone, but I find with my Spigen case it's works well because then the screen isn't moving because of the case.Overall, very big fan of Zagg protectors. They have been able to withstand multiple full force falls, while the screen has been left intact each time.

I've had great experiences with Zagg through all my smartphones. IPhone case withstood my full body weight forcing it to the ground, the HD Glass for S7 chipped the screen protector and started to crack after falling down mountain hike, while the screen itself was in perfect condition. I've twice had to use the replacement option, and have been pleased with it both times.This screen cover is better suited, I find, for tge S7 compared to the Glass S7 case, which made the pull down menu and back/tab buttons nearly inaccessible. When that happened, Zagg refunded my Glass purchase upon return, and u havr been happy with the HD screen protector ever since. Some complaints are about how it's not rntoreky flush against the curved edges of the phone, but I find with my Spigen case it's works well because then the screen isn't moving because of the case.Overall, very big fan of Zagg protectors. They have been able to withstand multiple full force falls, while the screen has been left intact each time. It does what it is supposed to do, protect the screen from scratches & dings.

However, the slight curve on the edge of the screens causes the edges of the screen protector to not stick to that tiny curve so dirt & what not gets stuck under that edge. I wish they could make a screen protector that curves just that little bit on the edges. This screen protector seems to not be as durable as other ones from my past phones. I've had 2 get cracked right away when my phone was in my pocket all by itself. My other phones screen protectors never got cracked and i would even carry them in my pockets with other things.

Shadow Protect Crack

Copy Protect Crack

I've had great experiences with Zagg through all my smartphones. IPhone case withstood my full body weight forcing it to the ground, the HD Glass for S7 chipped the screen protector and started to crack after falling down mountain hike, while the screen itself was in perfect condition. I've twice had to use the replacement option, and have been pleased with it both times.This screen cover is better suited, I find, for tge S7 compared to the Glass S7 case, which made the pull down menu and back/tab buttons nearly inaccessible.

When that happened, Zagg refunded my Glass purchase upon return, and u havr been happy with the HD screen protector ever since. Some complaints are about how it's not rntoreky flush against the curved edges of the phone, but I find with my Spigen case it's works well because then the screen isn't moving because of the case.Overall, very big fan of Zagg protectors. They have been able to withstand multiple full force falls, while the screen has been left intact each time.

'I was able to log in via telnet and http, which allowed me to dump memory, delete files and execute commands,' says Dillon Beresford, the security researcher with NSS Labs who discovered the password, and at least a dozen more subtle security holes.Beresford had planned to discuss a few of the vulnerabilities at TakeDownCon in Texas in May, but pulled the talk at the last minute after Siemens and the Department of Homeland Security expressed concern about disclosing the security holes before Siemens could patch them. Since then, he discovered additional vulnerabilities in several models of Siemens PLCs that would variously allow attackers to bypass authentication protection in the PLCs and reprogram them, or issue a 'stop' command to halt them.

They all require the attacker to have access to the network on which the PLCs run. One of the main vulnerabilities, he says, is that the systems have no defense against a so-called 'replay attack'.

An attacker could intercept commands going from any Step7 control system to any PLC – including a system in his own lab that he controls – and later play them back to any other PLC.The attacker, for example, can capture a CPU “stop” command going from his own Step7 engineering workstation to his PLC, then replay the command back to another PLC to shut it down. He could also sabotage whatever the PLC is controlling by replaying malicious commands that would, for example, cause the speed of motors or rotors to increase on a centrifuge or cause valves to open or close on a pipeline.“If I could only replay the same traffic into my own PLC, that would constitute a vulnerability,' Beresford said. 'The fact that I can record traffic going to and from my own PLC, and play them back to any PLC, that’s what makes it a big issue.' Generally, this kind of captured traffic should have a session ID that expires.

But the Siemens PLC session never expires, Beresford said, so an attacker can use the captured traffic repeatedly, unless the PLC he's attacking crashes and an administrator physically re-cycles it and then issues a “run” command to restart it. It's possible for an attacker to communicate directly with the PLC, without needing to use Siemens Step7 system, because Siemens' PLCs don’t restrict or otherwise limit which computers communicate with them. There are no rules in the PLC limiting traffic or commands to specific IP addresses or to specific computers with Step7 installed on them, Beresford said. The PLCs also do not keep logs to identify the computers that send them commands, so trying to identify the source of a malicious command a PLC received would be difficult.Siemens did not respond to a request for specific comment about the vulnerabilities but said the company had sent several representatives to the BlackHat conference and is working with Beresford to understand and patch the vulnerabilities. 'ICS-CERT and Siemens have issued technical alerts/updates on this topic, and will continue to do so on an as-needed basis,' said Frank Garrabrant from Siemens SIMATIC Security Industry Automation Division, in a written statement.Previously, Siemens has asserted that the attacks Beresford describes could be thwarted by air-gapping PLCs and their control computers from the internet.

But according to Vik Phatak, CTO of NSS Labs, not all companies have a complete understanding of what constitutes an air-gapped system.“We’ve talked to a number of different companies that have told us that their version of an air-gapped network means there’s no inbound connection, but they definitely have outbound connections to the internet for their employees,” Phatak said. Even air-gapping a system would not work if someone plugged removable media containing malware into the system.The only thing on the PLCs that would prevent an attacker on the network from communicating directly with the devices is an authenticated packet that passes from the Step7 machine to the PLC. But Beresford found a way to bypass this authentication protection.Step7 machines authenticate themselves to a PLC using a hash generated from a password. The hash is stored inside a project file that gets sent from the Step7 machine to a PLC. If the hash matches a hash stored on the PLC, a switch on the PLC is flipped that allows a programmer to then read and write to the PLC. Beresford found that he could bypass this by capturing the authentication packet and replaying it to a PLC.“If you capture it, you have the authenticated packet, there’s nothing the PLC can do to stop you,” Beresford said. As for the hard-coded password, 'Basisk,' that he found in the S7-300 firmware, Beresford says it was obfuscated by a basic shift sequence that involved swapping characters and shifting them to the right.

It took him two and a half hours to decode the password. Beresford could only confirm that the hardcoded password existed in a specific version of the firmware on his S7-300 PLC – firmware version 2.3.4.The credential would give a user command shell access on the PLC, allowing someone to reprogram the PLC or otherwise completely control it.

The password also gives access to a memory dumping tool, that would allow an attacker to dump memory from the PLC in real time in order to gather intelligence on the PLC to devise a targeted attack.He found he could dump SDRAM, uncached and cached, NOR flash, as well as other parts of RAM and scratchpad data. He could also obtain the serial numbers and tag names of devices connected to the PLC. All of these would allow an attacker to discover new vulnerabilities in the system and to determine what's connected to the PLC and what normal operating conditions exist for those devices in order to design a worm like Stuxnet to attack them. An attacker could also write a worm that copied itself to a PLC – so that anyone who communicated with the PLC would be infected – or use the PLC to launch attacks against other machines on the same network. Siemens has acknowledged that the password existed and said that developers had put it in the system for testing purposes, but then forgot to remove it.ICS-CERT has issued an (.pdf). According to the alert, Siemens discovered the password in 2009 and removed it from subsequent systems.

But anyone using pre-2009 versions of the S7-300 firmware would likely still have the password installed.“Anything before October 2009, for the PLCs, in terms of the S7-300, would be affected by the hardcoded password,” Beresford said.Finally, Beresford also found an Easter egg in two versions of the S7-300 PLC firmware – versions 2.3.2 and 2.3.4. It’s an html file that depicts a handful of dancing chimpanzees and a German proverb that is the equivalent of the English phrase, 'All work and no play makes Jack a dull boy.'